

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

Memo Choro

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL	X			
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	Counselor to CIA		X		
18	ES		X		
19	C/S		X		
20	C/LA		X		
21	C/CATF		X		
22					
SUSPENSE		10 Oct 86 <small>Date</small>			

Remarks

To 13: Please arrange for meeting with Congressional Ad Hoc group as requested and advise DCI where things stand.

Executive Secretary

29 Sep 86

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

88-4389


29 September 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/OCA

FROM: DCI

SUBJECT: Ad Hoc Central American
Working Group

I think we should invite this group in
for a round table discussion.


William J. Casey

ccs - DDCI
Counselor to CIA

~~SECRET~~

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

September 18, 1986

Hon. George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

With the passage of the bipartisan Edwards-Skelton amendment in the House and reaffirmation by the Senate of its earlier support for aid to the contras, the Congress seems finally on its way toward providing substantial economic and military aid to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. We are beginning a new, historic chapter in U.S. policy toward Central America. We now owe it to both ourselves and our friends in the region to make sure this policy succeeds.

We would like to participate in the continuing effort to develop a long-term strategy which will bring democracy and peace to Central America. There are several important areas -- aid implementation, media campaigns, further building of the bipartisan consensus -- in which we believe congressional supporters of the aid package must be more directly involved.

We cannot afford to be complacent. Domestic and international opinion opposing aid to the contras is still very strong. A fragile coalition exists in the Congress. Opponents of this policy have waged this battle before and are going to re-group and "wait for something to go wrong." The burden of proof is on us, as supporters, and on the contras.

A bipartisan consensus on contra aid is emerging because more Members of Congress are convinced we have a vital national interest in bringing real democracy to Nicaragua. The key to success will be the extent to which we can convince not merely ourselves, but the Nicaraguan people, that there truly exists a viable democratic alternative to Marxist-Leninist rule.

We must prove this by supporting groups which are unified, democratic, and respectful of human rights. Otherwise, no matter how much the Sandinistas repress their people, or support neighboring insurgencies, or ally themselves with communist nations, Nicaraguans will have neither the desire nor the confidence to seek political change. At that point, there will be legitimate questions about whether continued U.S. involvement in the aid program serves U.S. interests.

Page Two
Secretary Shultz

We obviously have to give support for the contras a chance to work. Time works on the side of the guerrillas. They cannot win tomorrow, but they can ultimately prevail through a gradual process of providing political and psychological support for those who may be encouraged to speak out inside Nicaragua.


Yet, if we cannot expect too much too soon from the contras, we must also be prepared to expect different things from them than we have in the past. They must prove themselves to be democratic and to observe human rights. They must show they can become a cohesive fighting force. They must have a blueprint for their country. We must never forget that our aim is to bring democracy, not another dictatorship, to Nicaragua.


Opponents will focus on three basic areas: contra human rights violations, lack of aid accountability, and resistance group disunity. It will be important for the contras to try to prove themselves in these areas immediately, for both their supporters and opponents. They will face heavy pressure to show they have popular support inside Nicaragua, that they can fight effectively and cohesively, that they can secure and hold territory, and that they can stimulate unrest in urban areas. It is a huge responsibility, but one which we must expect the contras to meet, not overnight, and not without help from the United States, but within a reasonable time frame and with substantial success.

We believe the success of this program is dependent on a degree of congressional oversight and coordination not previously exercised by contra aid supporters. We want to assist the administration by serving as an Ad Hoc Central America Working Group. We have come a long way toward crafting an aid program which responds to various criticisms and holds great promise of success. If we expect to keep the momentum going, we must show progress in the field, demonstrate that we are following a pre-determined game plan, and thus continue to attract a broader group of bipartisan supporters.


We look forward to maintaining regular contact with you and others who are most importantly involved in bringing the cause of freedom and democracy to Central America.

Sincerely,



Mickey Edwards
Member of Congress


Ike Skelton
Member of Congress


Page Three
Secretary Maltz




Richard Ray
Member of Congress




Rod Chandler
Member of Congress




Dick Cheney
Member of Congress




Buddy Roemer
Member of Congress




Charles W. Stenholm
Member of Congress



Connie Mack
Member of Congress



E. Thomas Coleman
Member of Congress



Tommy F. Robinson
Member of Congress

cc: Hon. Donald T. Regan
Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter
Hon. Elliott Abrams